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Free Expression and Digital Dreams: The Open 
and Closed Terrain of Speech 
Monroe E. Price 
Each new communications technology (theater, print, telegraph, tele- 
phone, radio) presents the possibility of altering the infrastructure of dis- 
course. As it is absorbed, implemented, and developed, each technology 
plays out and reshapes ideas of community. Societies, as Karl Deutsch 
wrote, reveal themselves and can be differentiated through the distinctive 
webs of social intercourse that are the consequence of particular domesti- 
cations, adaptations, or responses to innovations in modes of communi- 
cating. ' Because the current and massive redesign in the communications 
infrastructure-digital dreams of an electronic highway-will yield basic 
changes in social structure, governments are destined to try to affect the 
pace and direction of transformation. We are at an early stage, but gov- 
ernment responses already seem chaotic, fitful, and undertheorized, 
more the product of the interaction among pressure groups than of some 
coherent notion of the role of free speech in society. 
To these often scrambling, clumsy, and seemingly dissimilar efforts, 
I want to add a more general theory about how to accommodate conflict- 
ing ideas about speech, technology, and society. In thinking about the 
impact of the new technologies on freedom of speech, I want to posit two 
fundamental, and different, forms of speech patterns in society, patterns 
that I call the open and the closed terrain of speech. These forms have 
different functions, different etiologies, and different regulatory re- 
1. See Karl Deutsch, Nationalism and Social Communication: An Inquiry into the Foundations 
of Nationality (Cambridge, Mass., 1953), esp. pp. 70-74. 
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sponses. One form is not necessarily more central to a democratic society 
or more consistent with First Amendment values than the other. What is 
significant, in any society, is the balance between the two. What is im- 
portant-and threatening-about the new technology is that it undoubt- 
edly causes a significant dynamic shift in that mix, a shift in the way 
information is transmitted and distributed within a group of citizens. 
It is hard for us, as a society, to see the shift or to appreciate its conse- 
quences; we are taken rather with slogans than with substance. At the 
close of the twentieth century in Europe and the United States, 
the emerging symbol of a new future is the electronic superhighway- 
the vision of five hundred channels (or a single switched channel of access 
to a universe of information), unlimited interactivity, and the capacity for 
heightened consumer choice and apparent control. The vision is full of 
promise, freedom, and choice. It is the hope for a life of ultimate choice 
without externally imposed boundaries. Not only is the metaphor a pow- 
erful one; it is driving policy by creating expectations of a speech nirvana. 
But most expressions of the vision, for all the industrial excitement, 
tell little or nothing about its impact. Five hundred channels-or the 
more likely fully switched network-could be like five hundred models 
of automobiles or flavors of chewing gum; it could provide either actual 
diversity or the illusion of choice. Five hundred channels could create 
new concepts of cohesiveness or it could contribute to the balkanization of 
community.2 Their content could reinforce national identities or destroy 
them. Public debate could be enhanced or diminished. Five hundred 
channels could mean more news, as is often assumed, or, in the absence 
of public attention, less, and certainly the disappearance of newspapers 
as we know them. The new abundance could mean a multiplication of 
channels that increase the openness of government or the undermining 
of those experiments in access that now exist. Five hundred channels 
could be organized to provide lifeline service to the poor and the aged, 
or it could mean a two-tiered system of access to information and enter- 
tainment that increases the gap between haves and have-nots. Five hun- 
dred channels could mean a healthier political system with greater access 
2. See Henry H. Perritt Jr., "President Clinton's National Infrastructure Initiative: 
Community Regained?" Chicago-Kent Law Review 69 (1994): 991. 
Monroe E. Price is Dancyger Professor of Law and director of the 
Squadron Program on Law, Media, and Society at Yeshiva University's 
Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law. He is editor of the Post-Soviet Media 
Law and Policy Newsletter and author of Shattered Mirrors: Our Search for 
Identity and Community in the AIDS Era (1989) and Television, Public Sphere, 
and National Identity (forthcoming). 
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by political parties and more substantive discourse by candidates, or it 
could mean unmediated, uncritical, sharply divisive perspectives and an 
acceleration in the correlation between wealth and access to voters. Five 
hundred channels could provide room for more public broadcasting, but 
its hyped-up promise has already been used to justify the contraction of 
the federal role. New technologies can provide the infrastructure that 
makes existing polities more efficient, or they can be the web of their un- 
doing. 
The political dimensions of these vast changes in technology are 
drowned in fanciful enticements: more is better, motion equals freedom. 
In terms of technological plenty, more is not only thought to be good; it 
is considered to be inevitable. Abundance equals choice equals liberty. 
Progress is measured by the move to higher planes of availability. But 
more can be less: more pollution, more violence, more distance of indi- 
vidual both from self and from community. Indeed, the bleak prospect 
exists that more channels can mean endless variations on the same 
themes-endless repetition with changes in time slot as a fig leaf for 
choice. The vocabulary of change provides insight into the social out- 
comes. The concept, for example, of an electronic highway helps define 
the probable government role as minimal, limited to planning, to some 
traffic-cop functions, and to the minor collection of tolls. But thinking of 
change in another way-say in terms of its impact on education, or liter- 
acy, or the competitiveness of labor-might yield a different definition of 
the government's authority.3 
The transition to a more complex technical system, given to inter- 
activity and narrowcasting, may alter the definition of a proper role for 
government, clumsy enough in the era of broadcasting, in relation to the 
architecture of the new media. Classic American First Amendment analy- 
sis has assumed that a forum for public discussion-a marketplace of 
ideas-ordinarily exists. "Scarcity" justified the very limited government 
role of intervening when extreme cases of market failure were present. If 
the marketplace, as a locus of public discussion, diminished for structural 
reasons (bottlenecks caused by monopolies, for example), government 
involvement in reconstructing a public sphere could become essential. 
Open and Closed Terrain 
My claim, in this essay, is that these traditional justifications should 
be supplemented by another framework. Much of the history of govern- 
3. See the discussion of Habermas in Nicholas Garnham, "The Media and the Public 
Sphere," Communicating Politics: Mass Communications and the Political Process, ed. Peter Gol- 
ding, Graham Murdock, and Philip Schlesinger (New York, 1986), p. 41; hereafter abbrevi- 
ated "MPS." Much of this discussion draws on Garnham's article. Garnham states, "Changes 
in media structure and media policy, whether these stem from economic developments or 
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ment regulation of speech can be reinterpreted in terms of the distinc- 
tions between the open and closed terrains of speech and the assumption 
that the balance between the two could be regulated to ensure easy access 
by speakers to willing listeners. To show that this is the case, I will expand 
on the distinction between the two models of speech, reviewing, in the 
process, a few instances of speech regulation reinterpreted to fit the 
model of the open and closed terrain of speech. To demonstrate the juris- 
prudential pain of the transition from one sort of information infrastruc- 
ture to another, I draw not only on long-standing aspects of speech 
regulation but on problems that have been presented by the move from 
broadcast television to cable. By rethinking First Amendment jurispru- 
dence in this way, the riddle of the five hundred channels can then be 
more suitably addressed. For the problem will be not how many channels 
there will be-an illusion of abundance-but the balance and mix be- 
tween various forms of speech and the implications of shifts in that bal- 
ance for important societal values. 
Consider a world of channels of communication that are transparent, 
commonly received, pervasive, and everywhere available. Think of these 
as a kind of open terrain, like the spaces that have been used for public 
speech in the mass media in recent decades (or, like the streets, from 
time immemorial). In opposition, consider a closed terrain of channels of 
communication that are reserved and private, encrypted and privileged, 
channels in which important discourse takes place, but that are not so 
open to the public view. Much, though not all, of our current legal discus- 
sions concerning the media and free speech is based on the predomi- 
nance of the open terrain or, at least, a substantial theater of speech in 
which information is democratically available and views can be commonly 
expressed. There is nothing intrinsically better about the open rather 
than the closed terrain. On the other hand, some appropriate balance or 
configuration of the two forms of speech is felicitous for the workings of a 
democratic society. When the First Amendment prohibits Congress from 
enacting any law that abridges freedom of speech or of the press, certain 
assumptions about the combination and functioning of the open and 
closed terrains of social intercourse are at work. 
What changes, mainly as a result of technology, is the undergirding 
of these assumptions, toward a closing up of the open terrain, away from 
the broadcast channels, channels underwritten by advertising or govern- 
ment-and therefore seemingly free-toward the narrowcast channels, 
encrypted pay channels and pay programs in which all information is 
metered and individuals pay for what they receive. There are undoubted 
from public intervention, are properly political questions of as much importance as ... 
subsidies to political parties" ("MPS," pp. 37-38). A different article with the same title by 
Garnham appears in Habermas and the Public Sphere, ed. Craig Calhoun (Cambridge, Mass., 
1992), pp. 359-76. 
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benefits to the shift away from universalizing fora for speech and toward 
the particular, and it would be wrong to be Luddite in the face of techno- 
logical enrichment. On the other hand, because the effects of a shift on 
speech patterns could, and probably will, be quite radical, those conse- 
quences should be explored. 
In the imagined city-state of the past, the agora or town hall was the 
theater for political expression where citizens assembled. The structure 
of expression in industrialized modern society allows for various substi- 
tutes for the agora, substitutes in which masses are accumulated through 
great newspapers or newsreels, and, finally, through the unifying radio 
and television channels often held in public or monopoly hands. 
In the new technology, patterns of speech shift from a structure that 
has the elements of theater to a structure that approximates veins in the 
body, coursing invisibly, carrying valuable data, essential and effective, 
providing more particular and more specific functions than in the struc- 
ture of old. The agora closes, the parks become gated, the subdivisions 
are reinforced against intruders as the new technology helps to reaffirm 
a possibly richer, but very differently public form of discourse. Specific 
examples of the shift may be helpful. One example, outside the technical 
bounds of communications policy, is the conception of the public library 
and public information sources. Formerly a reservoir of books and mate- 
rials available to all at no charge, the "library" is reemerging as a variety 
of databases, information to be metered, charged by the minute or the 
megabyte. Far more is available, more conveniently, but not in the con- 
ventional form of the common building with wooden chairs and tables 
and books available, without a fee, to all alike. Andrew Carnegie's com- 
mon temples to communal advancement, a model public gift, were well- 
designed buildings for study and research that would advance social life 
and help fulfill democratic expectations. Now that model of a public gift 
is transformed to arguments for universal access to databases as part of 
an electronic infrastructure. 
Another site of transformation is the theater of news. The faded 
twentieth-century ideal (probably never ideal and never realized) has 
been of a mass media bringing together a national audience for the telling 
of a common narrative of relatively high quality. That ideal dissolves, 
now, into one of information on demand, reorganized and purchased 
separately for each household, designed, re-created, and repriced for 
each individual. The era of three networks, with their familiar anchors, 
each differentiated more in nuances of style than in political and eco- 
nomic outlook, is giving way to the potential for sharply distinguished, 
angular, calcifying, and reinforcing message senders whose versions of 
the news will vary far more substantially. The debate over whether public 
broadcasting in its now-traditional form should be continued presents 
similar questions. Among the arguments for its destruction, for the end- 
ing of a generally available institution of culture and education, is the 
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existence of more available private channels for each consumer to select 
and thereby determine seemingly more personal or individualized 
modes of acculturation. 
There are consequences to this shift. For example, traditionally the 
cry has been that the answer to offensive speech is not censorship but 
more speech. But in the world of more closed terrain, additional speech 
does not necessarily mean more public communication. It may mean 
more stratification, more division, and intensified patterns of increased 
separation within the community. More speech, outside the context of 
the idealized open terrain with its meaningful debate, may instead lead 
to the hardening of views, not a sense of tolerance. Furthermore, espe- 
cially as the open terrain diminishes, a new scarcity emerges: its content 
becomes more controversial and the desire to regulate it increases. The 
very publicness of the open theater of speech begins to justify the fact 
that the narrative that inhabits it is subject to debate and social regulation. 
The more scarce (or relatively scarce) this field for the development 
of a sense of community becomes, the more intense the competition to 
affect it. 
The Public Sphere 
The distinction between the open and closed terrains of speech- 
and the importance of a balance between them-can be placed in a useful 
theoretical framework by turning to the concept of the public sphere as 
it has evolved in passionate debate among political scientists and philoso- 
phers.4 The public sphere, an idea used in evaluating speech practices 
and media structures, is most centrally a zone for discourse in which ideas 
are explored and a public view is crystallized. In Habermas's original 
description, the public sphere should be free of restrictions not only from 
government but from the great and overbearing forces of the economy 
so that the exploration of issues and the development of points of view 
have a certain authenticity. The key opinions of the public are, as it were, 
forged in the public sphere. The public sphere, in this classic aspiration, 
is a zone in which there is sufficient access to information so that rational 
discourse and the pursuit of beneficial general norms is made more likely. 
It is a set of activities in which the authority of preexisting status attri- 
butes-such as wealth, family, and ethnicity-lose their sway in the distri- 
bution of civic authority. Argumentation based on assumed laws of nature 
4. See Juiirgen Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into 
a Category of Bourgeois Society, trans. Thomas Burger (Cambridge, Mass., 1989). See also Ha- 
bermas and the Public Sphere, and Jean Cohen and Andrew Arato, Civil Society and Political 
Theory (Cambridge, Mass., 1992). Habermas himself has addressed the structure and func- 
tioning of the media in the public sphere. See chap. 8 of Habermas, Between Facts and Norms: 
Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy (forthcoming). 
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comes to have more influence. The public sphere is neither a fiction nor a 
mere debating society. It is a locus-though not a physical place-where 
debate has consequences. Its distinguishing characteristic, perhaps its sig- 
nature for Habermas, is that the conclusions reached in a properly work- 
ing public sphere must actually have a limiting impact on the state. 
Accounts of the historical evolution of the public sphere, though 
much disputed, illuminate its significance for modern democratic society 
and its relationship to media. Students of the emergence of liberal democ- 
racy in the eighteenth century pore over the preconditions of change, 
sometimes with the hope of recreating those conditions today. In Eng- 
land, according to the most favorable reports, a small, elect group of mid- 
dle-class citizens had, it is said, the luxury and resources to create a rich, 
complex, politically sophisticated civil society in which the instruments of 
discourse-newspapers, books, salons, debating societies-were used to 
create a social order largely independent of both church and state. An- 
other characteristic was the openness of this discourse to all, in the same 
way that the market is open to all. Every citizen, in the very limited 
eighteenth-century meaning of the term, could, in theory, participate in 
the public sphere. And participants in this public sphere "obeyed the 
rules of rational discourse, political views and decisions being open, not 
to the play of power, but to that of argument based upon evidence ... 
because its concern was not private interest but the public good" ("MPS," 
p. 41).5 
Habermas, later in his work, gave a grand name-the "Ideal Speech 
Situation"-to the operation of the public sphere. "Every time we speak 
we are making four validity claims, to comprehensibility, truth, appropri- 
ateness and sincerity" ("MPS," p. 42). Ideal speech is inconsistent with 
an intention to distort the truth or to use overweening power or wealth 
purposely to manipulate. The ideal speech situation is hardly the norm, 
though its assumptions permeate aspects of European broadcast legisla- 
tion. The elements are a condition to which a journalistic or speech com- 
munity can aspire, a set of measures by which one can evaluate any 
particular society or a structure of telecommunications.6 The health of 
the public sphere is related to the respect for the elements of ideal speech 
by those who use it. Or, put differently, a medium cannot be considered 
truly a participant in the public sphere if those who habitually use it do 
not, in their speech, abide by a high standard of truth, comprehensibility, 
appropriateness, and sincerity. 
There is a temptation to compare, unfavorably, the twentieth century 
5. Garnham states the usual criticisms of the eighteenth-century public sphere, among 
which, of course, was that access was restricted to bourgeois males, and their class interests 
were coterminous with the discourse. See "MPS," pp. 43-45. 
6. Sometimes the legal and regulatory frameworks look like efforts to reshape speakers 
so that they conform to a zone of ideal speech-in Habermasian terms-or to suggest to 
the audience that the speech they are witnessing follows those rules. 
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to the eighteenth, to infer from the calamities and disorder of the present 
scene an impossible culture for the maintenance or restoration of the 
public sphere. Habermas himself despaired, seeing the collapse of 
the eighteenth-century liberal world into the twentieth-century social- 
welfare, mass-democracy, commercialized state. The citizenry is no 
longer, if it ever was, an exclusive, passionately rational collection of 
people. The public sphere, as a broad field for communication, has lost 
the coherence furnished by a relatively high standard of education. In- 
stead, public debate is more consistently a locus only for harsh competi- 
tion among political groups, with political agendas and a kind of force 
that originates in powers different from reason itself. "Laws which obvi- 
ously have come about under the 'pressure of the street' can scarcely 
still be understood as arising from the consensus of private individuals 
engaged in public discussion. They correspond in a more or less uncon- 
cealed manner to the compromise of conflicting private interests."7 
Assessing the role of the modern media in the making of a contem- 
porary public sphere means discovering in the specific conditions for a 
public sphere how it might be impaired. For example, it is generally 
stated that an important quality is accessibility to citizens, with relatively 
low entry costs and relatively equal opportunities. A system in which costs 
to participate are bid way up and entry is scarce and difficult will, there- 
fore, be a poor version of the public sphere. The zone of contemporary 
discourse, by ideal public sphere standards, is distorted, if not mutilated, 
by imbalances of access, wealth, and power. The force of advertising, the 
power of public relations, the transformation of entire systems of the 
sponsorship of speech-all of these affect the ideal of the public sphere 
model. And, of course, since the golden age of Habermas's imagination 
the state has become a strong participant in what once constituted the 
public sphere. Sometimes as the authoritarian or totalitarian monopolist 
of speech, but always in some ways-as controller of spectrum, manager 
of satellites, subsidizer of newsprint and libraries, and as censor-the 
state modulates some of the means of communication. "Thus the space 
between civil society and the state which had been opened up by the 
creation of the Public Sphere was squeezed shut between these two [the 
economy and the state] increasingly collaborative behemoths" ("MPS," 
p. 41). No longer is there-if there ever was-a "space for a rational 
and universalistic politics distinct from both the economy and the state" 
("MPS," p. 41). One consequence of these historical developments is that, 
in a way different from Habermas's classic understanding of it, govern- 
ment becomes an implementer of the public sphere, not a "separate di- 
mension of social life."8 
7. Habermas, "The Public Sphere: An Encyclopedia Article (1964)," New German Cri- 
tique 1 (Fall 1974): 54. 
8. Michael Schudson, "The 'Public Sphere' and Its Problems: Bringing the State (Back) 
In," Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics, and Public Policy 8, no. 2 (1994): 532. 
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Regulating the Open Terrain 
Here, the changed balance between the open and closed terrains 
of speech becomes relevant. We are used to patterns of intervention by 
government that are expressed or justified in terms similar to those that 
would contribute to a Habermasian public sphere. The problem, how- 
ever, is that the forms of intervention depend on an understanding of an 
increasingly dated model of the fora of speech. Given that the open ter- 
rain-the theater of speech-has been the dominant form for the last 
half-century, much of current regulation (regulation aimed at rendering 
the media more democratic) has been shaped to correct its shortcomings. 
The danger, now, is that groups interested in a more democratic dis- 
course will not adjust to the fact that patterns of information flow and 
habits of opinion formation are shifting dramatically. 
Take as an example of regulations that assume an open terrain of 
speech those doctrines, often called access rules, designed to address the 
architecture of broadcasting and the relationship between the medium 
and the senders and receivers of information. These rules are historically 
justified because of their capacity to change and render more democratic 
a public theater of speech. One meaning of access, in modern communi- 
cations policy, is improving a forum so that anyone who wishes to listen 
or observe can do so. A different, more complex, and perhaps more im- 
portant meaning of access involves who can speak, and under what con- 
ditions. Communications systems can be designed and evaluated in terms 
of how much opportunity they provide for access by listeners and speak- 
ers. Access doctrines become an index of ways to reconstruct the mass 
media so that the predominant mode is no longer the few speaking to 
the many, but, at the least, the many speaking to the many. 
Some illustrations of the use of access doctrines in the traditional 
broadcast media demonstrate the nature of the speech forum that is as- 
sumed. Providing access, as a political agenda, for example, is shorthand 
for identifying those who have, for a variety of reasons, been excluded 
from the community's dominant discourse and providing them the op- 
portunity to speak to the general public, making more equitable the dis- 
tribution of opportunities for a citizen or group to address other groups 
or citizens. Gaining access has also come to mean something more, 
namely, the assurance that there is fair representation among those who 
control the electronic media, altering monopolies of the social narrative. 
More cynically, concepts of access have meant constructing a set of artifi- 
cial decorations, a false mosaic, a means of legitimating the dominant 
voices by putting on a show of toleration for difference and dissent. A 
mass media perceived as exclusionary by large segments of the popula- 
tion could have a destabilizing impact, and exhibiting concern about 
"access" is a means of forestalling perceptions of political injustice. Im- 
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proving access is taken to be a desideratum, a way of fulfilling expecta- 
tions of self-government. 
Regulating ownership of broadcast licenses has been a typical ex- 
ample of regulation based on assumptions about the open nature of the 
radio and television fora. American broadcast regulatory rhetoric has ex- 
pressed faith in the link between the ownership of the media and the 
social narrative of its content.9 The ownership-access policy had a me- 
chanical truth to it, but, especially in the age of the old technology, not 
much in addition. More owners of radio and television licenses were said 
to be better than fewer from the point of view of diversified speech, but in 
fact most broadcast licensees sought an affiliation with one of the national 
networks, if available, and adopted or "cleared" most of the networks' 
program offerings. Even if the programming that the local licensee se- 
lected was from non-network suppliers, there were patterns of great simi- 
larity, based on what would maximize audience or advertising revenues, 
or, more recently, payments directly from viewers. Seldom has classic 
broadcast ownership diversity-except in very specific market circum- 
stances-led to the kind of program diversity that is relevant to the public 
sphere. Neither Congress nor the FCC supported the argument, made 
for so long by the BBC, that a single manager of frequencies could max- 
imize audience by purposely and rationally diversifying the program- 
ming and by catering to smaller segments of the audience in ways that 
only a monopolist can. Whether U.S. laws failed or succeeded, they ex- 
isted because radio, and then television, produced such a dominant and 
ubiquitous panorama that opportunities to be represented had to be 
deemed generally available. 
For much the same reason, the classic period of broadcast regulation 
included laws that focused on the suppliers of speech. The granting of 
access to particular speakers or producers of programs presupposed 
some imbalance in output, some imperfection in the market, or some 
need, basic to the democratic enterprise, that a particular speaker or or- 
ganization of speakers gain entry into the public forum.?0 The most famil- 
9. Many proposals for government intervention to provide access seem objectionable 
because an official must determine whether the range of stories told and pictures shown 
properly represent some desired or actual reality. A more abstracted solution-affecting 
the composition of proprietors rather than the content directly-has seemed preferable. 
Thus, what might be called ownership access-mandating diversity among owners in order 
to achieve diversity in content-has been, until recently, a favored method of Congress and 
the FCC. 
10. For example, one of the most important current forms of guaranteeing access is 
the system employed by the European Broadcasting Directive that establishes goals and 
quotas for European Union programs. This intervention is justified not on economic pro- 
tection grounds but on the theory that a pool of creators capable of using television must 
be fostered in order to maintain a healthy creative community, rooted in national identity, 
that can, over time, contribute to a particularized and national public sphere. 
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iar suppliers of speech to enrich the public sphere are candidates for 
office and political parties. The federal government established rules, in 
conjunction with many other campaign-structuring provisions, to ensure 
that recognized or qualified political candidates are entitled to time on 
radio and television at a regulated price or rate that is nondiscriminatory 
among political candidates. Federal law assures that candidates can have 
access to television and radio stations at the lowest available rates and 
gives one candidate equal time when another candidate receives time, 
under prescribed circumstances.'1 
Government rules attempted, most famously, to redress imperfec- 
tions in the public sphere-as established through broadcasting-with 
such doctrines as the personal attack rule and the reply to editorial rule. 
If a broadcaster aired a personal attack, the person attacked had the right 
to respond, and a somewhat similar regime existed for editorials. As a 
consequence of congressional action legislating an antibias requirement 
for public broadcasting, the Corporation for Public Broadcasting an- 
nounced a policy under which it would seek out and provide financing 
for producers with points of view different from those already aired if the 
productions presented were controversial and, in some determined way, 
not "objective." The most famous policy of the FCC in this general area 
has been the centerpiece of the now-abandoned fairness doctrine, which 
required that broadcasters cover controversial issues of public impor- 
tance and, when doing so, provide the various sides of such issues.'2 It 
was-though not as an articulated matter-the openness of the broadcast 
terrain, its theatrical presence in the lives of the citizenry, that warranted 
a law like the fairness doctrine (whether the doctrine was effective or not, 
or even whether it was constitutional or not). 
When the FCC established its table of allocations for the distribution 
of television broadcast licenses in the early 1950s, it reserved channels for 
educational purposes. This allocation provided access to spectrum. The 
reservation can be seen as a wholesale act of providing access, first for 
11. Section 312(a)(7) of the Communications Act of 1934 authorizes the FCC to revoke 
a license "for willful or repeated failure to allow reasonable access to or to permit purchase 
of reasonable amounts of time for elective office on behalf of his candidacy." The statute 
was upheld in CBS, Inc. v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367 (1981). 
12. Strictly speaking, the fairness doctrine was not designed to provide access to speak- 
ers; groups were not granted the right to use airtime themselves to respond or to assure 
that all sides of a controversial issue were covered. It was the broadcaster's obligation to 
provide fairness and to design a method of achieving it. As it developed, there was some- 
thing deeply flawed about the fairness doctrine. Bureaucratized, the clumsy product of 
vying angry forces, the fairness doctrine of the 1970s became naturally extinct, unable, like 
the dodo bird, to fly when necessary. For those who believe that a healthy public sphere can 
and should exist entirely without state interference, the fairness doctrine could be seen as 
a prime symbol of the inherent complexity and undesirability of government involvement 
in enhancing the public sphere. 
74 Monroe E. Price 
Autumn 1995 75 
colleges and municipalities that sought to use the new medium in order 
to fulfill their public responsibilities to instruct, and then for a far broader 
range of cultural institutions. It was a fundamental decision about the 
architecture of the electronic public sphere. Certainly, the question of 
continued financial support of a public broadcasting system could be re- 
articulated as a part of such an effort. Twenty years later, many local gov- 
ernments, as part of a highly competitive system for awarding local cable 
franchises, required that cable operators set aside a certain amount of 
channel time for governmental, educational, and public uses. In the 
1970s, the FCC mandated that local franchises must have channels set 
aside for these educational and governmental purposes, but in the later 
Cable Act of 1984, Congress merely authorized, rather than compelled, 
these reservations. 
These access rules, government ordinances that skated along the 
edge of First Amendment theory, are founded on the dominance of an 
open terrain of speech. Television, in the model underlying these inter- 
ventions, is a theater of discourse, one that enters the life of the entire 
public. Because of television's centrality, society has an interest in which 
speakers have the opportunity to take their turn on this platform of pub- 
lic narrative. 
If the balance between the open and closed terrains of speech is 
changing, then the significance of these steps must be reexamined. To 
the extent that aspects of these rules relate to output (Were minorities 
adequately represented in the narrative? Were political parties fairly situ- 
ated in terms of costs and opportunities to deal with and build constituen- 
cies? Was there a general sense within society that the processes of speech 
were adequately accommodating?), new technologies change the context 
of the discussion, though not necessarily the need for government action. 
Reexamining Captivity 
Access doctrines are efforts to improve the operation of the open 
terrain. A second, often overlooked aspect of free speech jurisprudence- 
the captive audience doctrine-is designed to protect citizens from the 
oppressive quality of public narrative. The captive audience doctrine, like 
the transformation of access laws, helps to clarify the transition from one 
technology of communication to another and the difference between the 
open and the closed terrains of expression. Imperfect, tentative, subject 
of too few judicial decisions, the captive audience doctrine recognizes the 
dangers to an individual inherent in an open terrain of speech. In a 
world in which some speech strategies can be publicly enveloping and in 
which the stage intrudes into private lives, the individual may be subject 
to involuntary bombardment, the disappearance of privacy, and imagery 
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as a discordant and oppressive presence. In this sense, rules that help to 
protect listeners from being coerced into involuntary audition are based 
on the very publicness of speech. 
On the surface, the cases are confused. In Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prod- 
ucts Corp., the Court struck down a ban on unsolicited mailings of contra- 
ceptive advertisements and held that recipients are not captive merely 
because they receive adjurations in the mail and cannot be protected as 
if they were.'3 Similarly, recipients of public utility bills are not a captive 
audience.14 On the other hand, in some instances the picketing of private 
homes has been enjoined because the target is in fact "'captive.'""5 A fre- 
quent example of captivity involves the passengers in the buses and sub- 
ways of public transportation, for whom immunity from propaganda and 
dominating Muzak may be highly valued.16 Congress has passed a statute 
limiting junk phone calls, nettlesome interventions generated by machine 
that roll through numbers automatically and inflict the pain of automated 
talk on the human who answers the phone. Of course, scheduled televi- 
sion programming, by definition, is not so oppressive as to turn a viewer 
into a captive, but advertising that is subliminal or that appears unexpect- 
edly may have qualities of coercion. Even in that case, the mild captivity 
involved may only justify a requirement, in highly politicized circum- 
stances, that "another side" of the surprise intervention be presented.17 
This advanced and psychologically potent definition of captivity rests, of- 
ten, on rather mechanical distinctions, distinctions that may or may not 
have value depending on the manner in which new technology evolves. 
If surprise or ambush is the essence of captivity, then forcing disclosure 
of potential violence or segregating suspect programming on a clearly 
labeled and specially requested channel are potential solutions. 
In recent years, the notion that children are by definition captive has 
been used to justify substantial regulation of "indecency" on broadcast 
stations.18 The protection of children is founded on a kind of statutory 
captivity. These are individuals for whom broadcasting, the courts have 
said, is "uniquely accessible . . . even [to] those too young to read."19 Cap- 
tivity turns on whether judges believe that channels of distribution are 
"uniquely pervasive." In judicial and legislative debates concerning cap- 
13. See Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 74 (1983). 
14. See Consolidated Edison Company v. Public Services Commission of New York, 447 U.S. 
530, 538-42 (1980). 
15. Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 484, 487 (1988). 
16. See Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974). 
17. See Banzhaf v. FCC, 405 F.2d 1103 (D.C. Cir. 1968). 
18. See Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 932 F.2d 1504 (D.C. Cir. 1991), and Action 
for Children's Television v. FCC, 11 F.3d 170 (D.C. Cir. 1993); vacated for rehearing en banc. 
19. FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 749 (1978). "'A State may permissibly determine 
that, at least in some precisely delineated areas, a child-like someone in a captive audi- 
ence-is not possessed of that full capacity for individual choice which is the presupposition 
of First Amendment guarantees"' (Erzoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 214, n. 11 [1975]). 
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tivity, a large but uninformed aspect of discussion assumes the existence 
of a social structure in which a group called parents makes (or ought to 
make) decisions concerning what children hear or absorb. 
A formal aspect of captivity-captivity closely related to slavery-has 
attracted the attention of the creative legal scholar Akhil Reed Amar. He 
has focused on the Supreme Court appeal of Robert A. Viktora, who was 
convicted, with his teenage friends, of assembling a crude cross, made 
from broken chair legs, and setting it afire within the fenced yard of a 
black family in St. Paul, Minnesota. The malefactors were arrested under 
a city ordinance that made it a misdemeanor to use certain symbols, spe- 
cifically including a burning cross, that would likely arouse anger, alarm, 
or resentment on grounds of race, color, creed, religion, or gender. The 
Court, in a noteworthy opinion restricting the power of states to pro- 
scribe categories of expression, struck down the St. Paul ordinance. Gov- 
ernment, it said, could not pick and choose what kind of hate speech was 
offensive. Amar saw in the case something else: "the intentional trapping 
of a captive audience of blacks, in order to subject them to face-to-face 
degradation and dehumanization." These circumstances engendered a 
badge of servitude.20 Captive exposure to speech that was race-based thus 
raised Thirteenth Amendment issues beyond the ordinary concern 
that "there simply is no right to force speech into the home of an un- 
willing listener."21 For Amar, it is not only the nature of the speech but 
the circumstances of its delivery that suggest the power of the state to 
regulate it. 
The move from a burning cross on a St. Paul lawn to a Cor-Ten steel 
sculpture in an urban plaza may seem difficult. But public art is another 
example, like the Minnesota cross, of discourse that takes place within 
an open terrain and, therefore, illustrates particular hazards related to 
captivity or oppression. What makes the art public is precisely its location 
in a place where viewers come across it accidentally, as opposed to art 
within a museum or gallery or on the walls of a person's home. The fact 
that the art is public, in this specific audience-related sense, can justify 
greater societal mediation of competing claims of right. 
The issue is exemplified by the controversy over Richard Serra's 
Tilted Arc, the brooding and massive sheet of rusting steel that long stood, 
against intense public outcry, in front of the federal courthouse in New 
York's Federal Plaza. Powerful judges and some of the office employees 
who passed the sculpture daily called for its removal. Serra claimed that 
his free speech rights would be abridged by any action that destroyed or 
moved the sculpture from the site for which it had been commissioned 
by the General Services Administration of the federal government. Over 
20. Akhil Reed Amar, "The Case of the Missing Amendments: R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul," 
Harvard Law Review 106 (Nov. 1992): 158. 
21. Frisby v. Schultz, p. 485. 
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time, the issue of rights was reinterpreted. Here was an essentially public 
space, a nicely geographical version of the open terrain of speech and 
ideas. Those who populated the region asked what limits could be placed 
on the nature of speech within that space (contractual rights aside). Hear- 
ings were held, and a perspective reminiscent of decisions requiring "fair- 
ness" in broadcasting seemed to emerge.22 The rights of the viewer, as 
well as the rights of the purported speaker, were entitled to consider- 
ation.23 
A few years after the height of the debate, David Antin, the perfor- 
mance artist who, among other things, has orchestrated projects of poetic 
skywriting, raised questions about the ethical propriety of Serra's argu- 
ments based on First Amendment rights. "'Think of it this way ... the 
nice thing about [skywriting] is it goes away fast, if you don't like it. And 
if you do like it, you remember it. But it takes an awful lot of energy to 
get rid of Tilted Arc."'24 For Antin, if we adapt his argument to the issues 
here presented, duration of message is a variable that helps determine 
problems of abuse and occasions for mediation in the open terrain: 
We would probably have very much better public art if every- 
body wasn't afraid of disturbing people, because they knew you 
could eventually wheel the art away. I would like to suggest that you 
could make the most disturbing public art in the world and nobody 
would give a damn, because you would know that after some limited 
time it would go away. The way all good discourse goes away. I don't 
think public art installations should be permanent. I think they 
should be wreckable. I think we should have a ceremony of destruc- 
tion and remove them regularly. I think works like Serra's work 
should after some specifically limited time have been publicly de- 
stroyed in an honorable fashion.... There was no reason for Serra 
to iterate his single utterance forever. Perhaps the right to repeat 
yourself endlessly in a given space is not freedom of speech. It may 
become a form of tyranny.25 
Captivity, then, is a condition intrinsic to the openness of speech and 
to the perceived risks of unmediated communication between powerful 
speakers and such weak listeners as children, or between speakers and 
listeners who cannot escape or should not be made to divert themselves 
22. See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969). 
23. See Richard Serra v. United States General Services Administration, 847 E2d 1045 (2nd 
Cir. 1988). In Lebron v. National Railroad Passenger Corporation (Amtrak), 115 S.Ct. 961 (1994), 
reversing 12 F.3d 388 (2d Cir. 1993), a performance artist rented the "Spectacular," a huge 
sign in Pennsylvania Station, to mount an advertisement satirizing the Coors Beer Com- 
pany for its support of right-wing causes. Amtrak refused to run the ad. The Court held 
that the case implicated "state action" and remanded to determine whether there were 
appropriate grounds for the advertisement to be rejected. 
24. David Antin, "Fine Furs," Critical Inquiry 19 (Autumn 1992): 155. 
25. Ibid., p. 162. 
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from speech they cannot abide. Whether a listener or viewer is captive 
depends, as I have suggested above, on the complexity of the arrange- 
ments by which speech moves from sender to recipient. The more com- 
plex the steps taken by the recipient, the more likely it is that information 
has been specially requested or paid for and that (in the paradigms sug- 
gested here) the pathway is closed, but the less likely that the person 
receiving it is a captive. 
Intense Diasporic Communities and the Closed Terrain 
So far, in my discussion of access and captive audience doctrines, I 
have dealt with the "problems" of a speech terrain that is and potentially 
remains open. Regulatory approaches, like the access doctrines, are de- 
fended as exemplars of democratic enhancement or therapeutic correc- 
tion. These approaches are based almost entirely on a model of 
communications technology in which the information exists in a forum 
purporting to be available to the common gaze. The legislative goal is not 
only making service universal and transparent but determining who will 
have access, who will control the narrative, and how participatory the 
forum will be. 
But openness, I have asserted, is declining as a paradigm. The new 
technologies, redolent with addressability (the capacity of producers to 
reach individual households rather than the mass) and complex interacti- 
vity (the capacity for senders and receivers to communicate) are distin- 
guished because of their tendency to be closed. The power to efficiently 
establish closed channels and to collect money from individuals, based on 
the intensity of their response to a particular set of offerings, is not only 
a hallmark of these new systems but the distinguishing factor that allows 
financing and development to go forward. Because of this process of con- 
tainment and rerouting of speech, the very abundance of channels may 
mean more, not fewer, calls for government intervention to ensure that 
something remains of the public space. 
The closing of the speech terrain is particularly important, as I have 
mentioned, because it mirrors other developments in society. The 
voucher system for schools is another, more virulent manifestation of 
the trend away from publicness, which provides a technical answer to the 
inability to agree on curricula. As with television, here is an interesting 
example of open terrain, an arena where children have mandatory expo- 
sure to a set of messages. An elaborate public agenda exists; formally or 
informally, machinery is established in every state for citizens and interest 
groups who seek to fashion or limit what is in the curriculum. The depic- 
tion of subjects about which there are sharp differences-accounts of 
American history, depiction of gays and lesbians, matters touching reli- 
gious beliefs-is a matter of negotiation in which governmental involve- 
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ment is central. Departures from consensus-no matter how justified- 
lead to an increase in the number of children who are taken out of the 
public schools (which withdraws them from the open terrain); a call for 
restrictions on or manipulation of content (for example, AIDS and sex 
education or prayer in the schools); and demands for political action to 
continue or, through elections, to alter the status quo. The closing or lack 
of substantial funding for libraries is a response to controversy over what 
books should be on their shelves.26 Public parks, swimming pools, and 
golf courses closed in the South in the 1960s, and later elsewhere, because 
the community could not constitutionally agree on acceptable patterns of 
their use. 
The scarcer the open terrain, the higher its value for the shaping of 
public views. The more difficult it is to reach consensus on what should 
be on the open channels of speech (those subject to negotiation and regu- 
lation), the more rapid the inclination will be to unregulated alternatives. 
A deeply divided community cannot easily tolerate a public space. These 
elements feed on themselves: technology and its industrial organization 
reduce the common narrative, and then the reduced common narrative 
makes the remaining public space more contentious. The vanishing of 
public space is more acceptable precisely because there can no longer be 
adequate consensus on what its content should be. 
The closing of the media rekindles the scarcity justification. If priva- 
tization proceeds apace, government intervention can become warranted 
to establish a new balance, to restore adequate open terrain, and to pro- 
vide rules of access and rules concerning content of an ever more pre- 
cious resource. Channels of communication may be abundant, but publicly 
available channels, the channels of open terrain, will be in short supply. 
More important as an outcome, for the purposes of the overall archi- 
tecture of speech, is the possible proliferation of what might be called 
intense and exclusive diasporic communities, assembled along ethnic, class, or 
interest lines. What makes them diasporic is that the members are physi- 
cally, though not spiritually, disassociated from one another; what makes 
them intense is the strength of loyalty to the group. Here, access takes on 
another meaning, embracing techniques that allow the marginalized to 
speak to the marginalized, improving internal communications networks 
for those who are otherwise disenfranchised. In a society dominated by a 
closed terrain of speech, audiences will be regrouped and redefined, with 
traditional hierarchical structures disturbed. Across the internet, using 
the new technologies of rapid and private communications, groups estab- 
lish new loyalties-sometimes to communities defined by religious fervor, 
ethnic pride, economic ambition, or place of origin-and abandon old 
26. See Board of Education, Island Trees Union Free School District No. 26 v. Pico, 457 U.S. 
853 ,(1982), which limited the power of boards of education to remove books from school li- 
braries. 
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ones. The internet has become a new mode for instant national and 
global organizing of constituencies. Given sufficient intensity, the cumula- 
tive impact of these newly formed communities on traditional constructs 
of loyalty, such as national identity, can be profound.27 
The closing of the terrain of speech endangers an architecture of 
speech in a democratic society in which some speakers, at some times, 
must have the right to broadcast their views, to invade, as it were, the 
airspace, reaching even those who might not wish to hear them. This is 
in stark contrast to the problem of captivity, or the right of the listener to 
choose not to be bombarded and to take refuge from the onslaught of 
modern technology. A dramatic shift from the open to the closed terrain 
of speech may give rise to a fairly novel category of rights or claims of 
right: the rights of speakers to exercise by their choice who will be obliged 
to listen to their speech, and the rights of listeners to require certain 
speakers to make their words available to them. 
In that zone called cyberspace, the keepers of the new morality con- 
tend that there should be a limit on anonymous messages and that speak- 
ers should be obliged to identify themselves as sources. And just as the law 
now provides that some government meetings must be open and some 
government information available to the public, constraints may be im- 
posed on how extensive and unmonitored supposedly secret communica- 
tions can be between organizations and individuals in the future. 
The two rights, roughly a right of access and the right of privacy, 
must be separated; they have different justifications and different histori- 
cal bases. The right of the speaker and listener to form a closed commu- 
nity is akin to the right of association asserted by organizations like the 
NAACP when membership lists were demanded by ill-motivated state 
governments.28 The speaker's right to send a message solely to an in- 
tended recipient is similar to the right of the user of the postal service to 
be sure that only the addressee receives it. But the rights of a speaker to 
select only some listeners or of a group of listeners and speakers to mutu- 
ally establish their boundaries are not absolute.29 There must be limits, 
having to do with race or other matters, that justify legislation governing 
the power of speakers and listeners to establish their own intense di- 
asporic community. 
27. Daniel Dayan and Elihu Katz write about these communities in their works on 
significant public television events. They use the term diasporic ceremony. See Daniel Dayan 
and Elihu Katz, "Performing Media Events," in Impacts and Influences: Essays on Media Power 
in the Twentieth Century, ed. James Curran, Anthony Smith, and Pauline Wingate (London, 
1987), pp. 174-97. See also David Chaney, "The Symbolic Form of Ritual in Mass Commu- 
nication," in Communicating Politics, pp. 115-32. The debate is summarized in David Morley, 
Television, Audiences, and Cultural Studies (London, 1992). 
28. See NAACP v. State of Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958). 
29. Congress has enacted legislation that compels copyright holders to license their 
creations to cable operators. 
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Case Studies from the Latest Transitions 
I have tried to demonstrate some of the implications for government 
regulation that arise from the shift from an open to a closed terrain of 
speech. What is important, as well, is whether society can, through gov- 
ernment, affect the balance between open and closed terrain. It is too 
soon to know how legislators and other policymakers will address this 
question of balance on the electronic highway, but other recent telecom- 
munications transitions can be used to illustrate the complex social as- 
pects of settling upon a suitable configuration or balance as one 
technology of communication is related to another. 
An example is in the transition from broadcast television to cable 
television, which had the supposed quality of moving from a television of 
scarcity to a television of abundance. Certain provisions of the 1984 and 
1992 federal cable television laws, those dealing with indecency and ob- 
scenity, have a surface absurdity that can best be explained using the tools 
of this distinction between the open and closed terrain of speech. Pay 
television services, for example, including pay-per-view programs, are 
not covered by special provisions applying indecency standards to cable. 
On the other hand, in language of laborious and withering exactitude, 
the law requires that free promotions of pay channels (free to cable sub- 
scribers, that is) are regulated for their qualities of indecency. Programs 
that appear on so-called commercial leased-access channels can, if the 
cable operator wishes to do so, be subject to indecency exclusions, but if 
an operator does not exclude indecency, the system must segregate such 
programs on a specific channel that has to be specifically purchased by a 
customer or subscriber.30 Cable operators, who prior to the passage of the 
1992 act were immune from liability for obscene and indecent program- 
ming on public-access channels, are now empowered (and virtually re- 
quired) to impose rules barring such programming, and their immunity 
from prosecution and suit has been removed.3' 
Congress fumbled and stumbled in its search for distinctions, for cri- 
teria about modes of delivery and the relationship between the receiver 
and sender of messages, that might justify differential legal regimes. Its 
potpourri of rules reflects an intuition that there ought to be a difference 
between the treatment of channels of communication that are, more or 
less, open (part of a "basic service" in this case) and channels that are 
"selected" and, therefore, in some intimately contractual manner, tend 
toward the closed. The architects of these rules seem to have been moti- 
vated by a principle that can be articulated roughly as follows: channels 
of information and entertainment that are most in the control of an adult 
30. See Alliance for Community Media v. FCC, 10 F.3d 812 (D.C. Cir. 1993); vacated on 
granting of suggestion for rehearing en banc, 16 Feb. 1994, U.S. App. Lexis 6440. 
31. See ibid. 
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viewer (channels that the subscriber must specially request and specially 
pay for, channels where the subscriber has specific notice of content) 
ought to be subject to a lesser degree of imposed social control than chan- 
nels that might surprise the viewer (or the viewer's children). Channels 
that are more generally available-part of the common stock of imagery, 
part of the standard offerings-must be far more subject to a common 
code. The pay channels, the channels subject to special subscription, the 
films that must, for each and every one of them, be specially ordered- 
these have the characteristics of closed channels of communication. The 
new technology provides the audience with the illusion of autonomy and 
active participation. When a viewer dials a phone number or pushes a 
button to receive a motion picture in the home, paying for a single view, 
the programmer and viewer have a contractual arrangement for passing 
information between them. In contrast to the pervasive speech of the 
open terrain, the obligation of society to intervene in such a private trans- 
action is minimal. In exercising the paid right to view a movie, the recipi- 
ent has expressed his or her desire, and, except for the narrow 
possibilities of monitoring frontiers of hate, violence, and obscenity, the 
function of the state seems minimal. 
Another example of lawmaking, capable of being reinterpreted in 
terms of the open and closed terrain distinction, involves what are called 
must-carry rules, heavily contested laws that require cable television sys- 
tems to carry the signals of local commercial and noncommercial broad- 
cast channels. The cable industry, in its infancy, had fought for the right 
to deliver these broadcast channels that were the backbone of American 
television watching, but as it matured and nonbroadcast programming 
offered substantial competition, the industry wished to be free to deter- 
mine what programming should be available on their wire into the 
home.32 Undoubtedly, the FCC, and then Congress, in imposing rules 
requiring carriage to continue, were acting to protect the economic inter- 
ests of an industry they had long regulated. Whether they could do so 
under the First Amendment was a matter of substantial controversy. 
But there was something else. There was the fear that over time the 
quality and quantity of services on free, "over the air" television that had 
generally been made available to viewers would begin to diminish. In the 
early 1970s, as the transition was beginning, the FCC sensed the possible 
32. By the mid-1980s, with the coming of the satellite and the proliferation of new 
networks (like HBO and MTV), cable had many other products to sell (motion picture 
channels, news channels, and sports channels). In some instances, with limited shelf space 
available, cable systems wanted to discard local broadcasting stations to make room for the 
specially created program services. In response to intense pressure from broadcasters and 
from Congress, the FCC kept drafting must-carry rules that limited the freedom of cable 
operators, rules ultimately enshrined in the 1992 act. See Monroe E. Price and Donald W. 
Hawthorne, "Saving Public Television: The Remand of Turner Broadcasting and the Future 
of Cable Regulation," Hastings Communications and Entertainment Law Journal 17, no. 1 
(1994): 65. 
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danger and attempted to retain a competitive advantage for broadcasters 
over cable by giving them the exclusive rights to certain categories of 
programming (for example, sports programming-say the World Series 
or the Olympics-and certain dramatic forms and films) in order to pro- 
vide an economic basis for public-service uses of television.33 
In 1992, Congress went further, however, claiming that it was in the 
national interest to maintain a system of broadcast signals that would be 
almost universally available, no matter what they broadcast. In 1994, the 
Supreme Court, in Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC,34 held that, in 
principle, Congress could preserve "free television," though it held this 
only by a very narrow vote and only after redefining the history of broad- 
casting regulation.35 The Supreme Court's reading of the 1992 legislation 
is virtually inexplicable except in terms of an unconscious need to main- 
tain an open terrain of speech. In terms of appropriate congressional 
purposes, the must-carry rules are justified because of the need to protect 
some abstract thing called free television, a concept that must have some 
reference to the system of speech and society if its protection is to be 
understood regardless of its content and function.36 The Court and Con- 
gress, whether they were willing to say so or not, must have been commit- 
ted to preserving a certain stock of discourse in a mode of delivery-a 
theater of speech, as it were-available to more than the 60 or 70 percent 
of the American households who subscribe to cable. 
A related intertechnological problem of transition-with the unusual 
name of antisiphoning-can be redescribed as the search for a way to pre- 
serve (and maintain the quality of) the open terrain. In the early 1970s, 
as I have indicated, the FCC sought to hold for "free broadcasting" whole 
categories of programs: sitcoms, movies that were more than two and less 
than twenty years old, and, most important, certain sports events, such 
as the World Series, that ought in the eyes of Congress to be generally 
available. The 1992 cable television act repeats this concern with a provi- 
sion requiring a study of the "migration" of certain college sports from 
so-called free (or open) television to a pay or closed system. 
The courts have been hostile to these attempts, consistently rejecting 
them using a traditional free speech analysis. Both the antisiphoning 
rules and the must-carry provisions have had rough going. There have 
been problems (some of which have been resolved in the recent Turner 
33. See Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9 (1977); cert. denied, 434 U.S. 829 
(1977). 
34. See Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 114 S.Ct. 2445 (1994). 
35. See Price and Hawthorne, "Saving Public Television," p. 65. 
36. The Court did not credit the fact, though it was cited in the congressional findings, 
that this programming includes local news, programs that carry important elements of the 
political debate, and federally funded public, cultural, and instructional presentations. If 
anything, these content-related features were marks against the must-carry rules in the 
Court's superficial jurisprudence. 
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Broadcasting case) determining what legitimate purpose Congress was ad- 
dressing, what standard of review to apply, whether the remedy was nar- 
rowly tailored, and whether there was a sufficient basis for a decision 
before Congress (or the FCC). But these cases have all been decided un- 
der an old paradigm, a paradigm that assumes the substantially open 
nature of speech, and especially that of the mass media in society. The 
justification for the rules-preserving local news and information and 
providing a universal, free television service-only begins to receive cre- 
dence in Turner Broadcasting. Only therein does the Court seem to glimpse 
that the structure of discourse might be different in the future and that 
Congress has some responsibility for considering the nature and open- 
ness of the emerging technology. 
Technology and the Public Sphere 
I have tried to show how the tendencies toward closure along the 
information highway are especially important as part of a larger trend, 
namely, a systematic transformation in the distribution and presentation 
of speech (and social relations). The growing debate about the architec- 
ture of the national information infrastructure can thus be defined as 
concern over whether there is a need to assure through the force of law 
the maintenance of a public place, a sustained public sphere, and 
whether, to accomplish that goal, parts of the infrastructure demand 
rules of access and control of content. The strengthening of a Haberma- 
sian space where important issues are debated, independent of govern- 
ment and of dominant economic forces, can be a guide to determining 
whether any shift from the open to the closed terrain results in a balance 
that serves or frustrates public needs. 
Thus, rethinking technology means determining far more clearly the 
relationship between the organization and distribution of information 
and the public sphere; it involves recognizing that as the commons con- 
tract, new rules of protection and new modes of government intervention 
may be necessary to establish the preconditions of democracy. Some space 
must be cherished for speech that is held and communicated in common, 
open to all, not just in transactions where content, in packages of pro- 
gramming, is bought and sold privately. Turner Broadcasting is not enough. 
To preserve "free television" because, by convention, the commodity is 
almost universally available and requires no additional formal payment 
does not sufficiently contribute to a public sphere. The constitutional pro- 
tection of streets as a site for debate is, of course, meaningless if the 
speech to be protected within them is discouraged and dispersed. 
As technology transforms the channels of communication, there are 
more vital questions than the survival of the mode of television we call 
free. These include evaluating the cost of access by citizens to information 
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and the cost of access by information providers to citizens. In particular, 
the cost of providing information from candidates or government officers 
to voters and the cost to voters of receiving that information is a vital 
issue in a democratic society. Rules concerning political contributions are 
related because they are a form of intervening in the distribution of 
speakers' costs for gaining access to citizens. In an ideal speech situation, 
a subsidy to one speaker rather than another based on wealth-an ill that 
is constitutionally tolerated under current Supreme Court law-would 
certainly be disallowed. Other specific areas of attention might be the 
transformation of the way in which news is packaged and made available 
to assure that a base of common access leads to a broadly egalitarian par- 
ticipation in the public sphere. Even the enrichment of modern efforts to 
enhance such a base of information-efforts such as C-SPAN and public 
broadcasting-must receive attention. Care must be taken to avoid 
modes of government intervention that alter the public sphere so that 
it becomes more constrained, biased, and incapable of performing the 
functions necessary to maintain unimpeded discourse among citizens and 
between citizens and the machinery of politics. 
Just as there are weaknesses in the implicit Turner Broadcasting deter- 
mination that guaranteeing "free television" is a suitable congressional 
goal, similar weaknesses inhere in the call for "electronic democracy." 
For example, it is all too common to argue that the moral and political 
institutional scheme of liberal democracy no longer fits the aspiration of 
its citizens because of a sense of disempowerment and loss of self- 
government. These complaints, and the many like them, seem to invite 
technological solutions to provide opportunities for therapeutic alterna- 
tives, such as the idea of electronic town meetings. Jeffrey Abramson has 
defined the obstacles to easy transformation and the preconditions that 
need to be met before the virtues of the ancient form can be replicated in 
a modern teledemocracy.37 Too often the electronic town meeting models 
avoid the preparation, the immersion in the issues that characterized the 
idealized original. Too often, there is only the simulacrum of decision 
making. 
The electronic town meeting movement is one technique for build- 
ing the public sphere for citizen discourse, but it is very likely to become 
to democratic life what spectacle is to reality. Constructing a new instru- 
ment of democracy is a task that requires endurance and experimenta- 
tion. A more immediate task is that of reconstructing the rules for political 
campaigns. Recent campaigns, including the 1992 presidential campaign 
and the 1994 congressional races, seem, among other things, to mark a 
change in the infrastructure of political discourse. The campaigns made 
orthodox the formerly unorthodox use of such forms as the radio call-in 
37. See Jeffrey Abramson, The Electronic Commonwealth: The Impact of New Media Technol- 
ogies on Democratic Politics (New York, 1988). 
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shows and made predictable use of such forms as cable television, faxes, 
email, and networks of constituents connected by satellite for an intercon- 
nected address. The shift in technology appears to lead to a radical trans- 
formation in political campaign techniques. 
To reason to the public sphere from the history of broadcasting is 
problematic. These instruments of communication are not just late devel- 
opments of democratic societies, but neither are they necessarily the de- 
scendant of the newspaper, as opposed to vaudeville and the music hall. 
There is something about the emergence and history of radio (and later 
television) that is almost antithetical to the idealized notions of the public 
sphere. Almost from the beginning, radio was a vehicle of entertainment, 
a toy, a soother or organizer of the masses rather than a locus for inter- 
personal rational discourse among individuals dedicated to the public 
welfare. And in too many places in the 1930s, radio-and television after 
it-became instruments to rearrange loyalties rather than tools for debat- 
ing the public good. These technologies have been too useful for the sale 
of goods (or of ideas) for them to be conceptualized, automatically, as 
providing a neutral forum for public discourse. 
As television has risen to be of central importance in the conduct of 
the democratic process, the intertwined questions of cost of time, access 
to time, fairness of coverage, right to advertise, obligation to debate, and 
forms of campaign financing have always been the site for regulatory con- 
troversy. The illusion is that the new electronic media, by providing an 
abundance of channels and a greater choice of modes of linking speaker 
and listener, will redress some of the past problems of cost and cam- 
paigning. Here, again, certain fora will become more scarce and more 
subject to rationing, either on the basis of price or by means of regulation. 
The question will be how much of the campaign has to be common and 
open: for example, will presidential campaigns have orchestrated televi- 
sion debates as a legislated requisite? It may be that the "basic tier," an 
invented category that includes the fundamental television service that 
most households receive, should include some central elements of the 
political system, such as C-SPAN. As with sports, there must be concern 
with the diverting of campaigns to the closed terrain. In addition, the 
technologies of addressability and encryption mean an increase in the 
coded, differentiated messages sent by a single campaign to various con- 
stituencies, and the implication of that phenomenon for greater disclo- 
sure of campaign material cannot yet be determined. 
One frequently recommended tool to apply new technology to a 
more active public sphere involves ensuring that providers of service can 
gain access to cable (and other multiple-channel systems) on a common- 
carrier basis. The common carrier is the invention of ancient custom to 
establish the fair and nondiscriminatory use of an essential instrument 
for the conduct of society. A common carrier for transportation allows, 
within predetermined limits, assurance concerning travel. The common 
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carrier, providing transit at a set rate and without preference, was the 
model for ferrying across rivers since time out of mind. In the twentieth 
century, the telephone has been the common carrier, first for voice, now 
for data, and potentially for video. Some think of the common-carrier 
model as the perfect mechanism for a free-market society dedicated to 
unencumbered speech and access to modes of distribution of that speech. 
Multichannel common-carrier systems, viewed as the deus ex machina of 
the new technology, supposedly avoid the need for government intru- 
sions in the public sphere. 
Public-access channels, the idealized space of populist dreams, the 
romantic version of the public sphere, are also a modern fantasized con- 
tribution to mandatory open terrain. Based on the principle of first come, 
first served and rendered famous by "Wayne's World," they retain only 
an echo of the use of the streets to hector and implore. A soapbox in a 
small village may be an important part of its public sphere, while a soap- 
box in a global village can be the equivalent of shouting into the void. 
And without the necessary care, this is often what the public-access chan- 
nel has become. In practice, public-access channels have been an un- 
kempt corner, a place of disarray at the margins, but not a significant 
contributor to public debate.38 Congress, acting consistently with the no- 
tion that the open terrain is a place where narratives can be contested, 
recently sought to reduce the broad freedom of public-access users by 
establishing new guidelines for what constitutes unacceptable obscene or 
indecent programming.39 
Taken together, these measures-common carrier, architecture of 
openness, reformulation of the political process-some of which are now 
under legislative consideration, can be read as preliminary building 
blocks of a reconstituted public sphere.40 The very need for these steps 
implies that without intervention the public sphere would be crippled 
and nonfunctional. Because the measures are piecemeal, often coming 
38. When marginal and unpopular views have been propounded, cities and others 
have gone to court to try to censor them, as occurred with a Ku Klux Klan use of public- 
access channels in the Midwest. See Missouri Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v. Kansas City, 723 
ESupp. 1347 (W.D. Mo. 1989). 
39. See sec. 10 of the Cable Competition and Consumer Protection Act of 1992, dis- 
cussed in Alliance for Community Media v. FCC. 
40. The early skirmishing over the shape and architecture of aspects of the national 
information infrastructure reflects all of these speech-related concerns. Even though the 
system is most likely, and in most of its parts, the closed terrain of speech, the older thinking 
of common experience and entitlement finds its way into the discussion. There is a debate, 
for example, over universal access, which in this context means that each citizen or each 
household should have a basic entitlement to be part of the system. The nature of the 
debate over universal access has some aspects of the "theater" and the open domain to it. 
The idea is that there should be a common experience, or a basic set of information (and 
the capacity to manipulate it), that should be available to all regardless of income. The result 
is somehow like the department store converted into a series of boutiques: the space is still 
open to all, but the interior design is one that is a simulacrum of closed spaces. 
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from different motives and different groups, and because, at bottom, they 
depend on the ersatz culture of television, they will not yield a well- 
functioning public sphere. If the existence of a well-ordered public 
sphere is a precondition of a well-functioning democratic society, then it 
is important to determine whether these initiatives work together and 
how the public sphere seems to be evolving with respect to broadcasting 
and the new technologies in the United States. 
The public sphere in the twentieth century cannot be described with- 
out our thinking about the role of radio and television and the transition 
from old forms of press and speech to the new technologies. But we can- 
not understand this role without comprehending the simultaneous 
changes in the balance between the open and closed terrain of speech. 
The configuration of the electronic media determines, in large part, the 
patterns and framework for discourse in society. The immediate impulse 
is to think that many channels, with many speakers, produces a healthy 
public sphere in modern society; but we cannot avoid the process of anal- 
ysis that sheds light on how debate is conducted. We have yet to see 
whether electronic communication, in its evolved state of hundreds of 
channels, will produce yet another cheap technological illusion. 
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